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The present attempt to unravel the motives behind this letter, and other inysterious French appearances on the Sumatran scène, has hot entirely succeeded in removing the air of unreality about them. France hever had aii imjx>rtant share in the riches of the Archipelago spice trade, and appeared slow to understand the importance of Portuguese, Dutch and British commerce there. Consciously or otherwise she appeared drawn rather towards policies and commitments on the Asian mainland. The ambitions the French occasionally entertained for the Archipelago tended to focus at its extremities, Sumatra or the SuluBasilan area, which they perceived as serving more important activities in the Indian Ocean and China respectively.
Such initiatives as were taken in the Archipelago were motivated as rhuch by the dèsire to maintain the status of a great power, or to pursue chimerical visions both material and spiritual, as by a sober calculation of practical advantage. The boldest ventures were all left to languish after a few years. The more modest ones (the French Catholic Mission in Malaya, and some minor commercial enterprises), which.did build an unobtrusive basis for permanent French influence in the Malay world, appeared incapable of exciting the French imagination.
Nevertheless such intermittent activities could not fail to produce an impression on some of the Indonesian rulers concerned. In the 18th and especially the 19th century France did appear to many Malay and Indonesian rulers as a powerful alternative to their threatening neighbours, Holland and Britain. The British and Dutch themselves, moreover, frequently invoked the threat of French interference to justify further expansion. The long-term French contribution to the colonial history of the Malay Archipelago was more important in the shadow than the substance.
France's first contact with the Malay world was characteristic of all that followed, as much by the boldness of its conception as by the pathos of its outcome. The gifted Parmentier brothers of Dieppe led the first non-Portuguese expedition from Europe around the Cape to Indonesia. Hoping to reach China, they landed at Tiku, on the West Coast of Sumatra, in November 1529. Within a month both brothers had died there, and there was nobody to follow their footsteps. Among the most ambitious of the early voyages was that of Augustin de Beaulieu, who supplies the first record of a letter from an Indonesian ruler to a French king. The mighty Sultan Iskandar Muda of Atjeh received Beaulieu well, in 1621, and bestowed on him a letter for Louis XIII: 'Since God has made us great kings in this world, it seems reasonable that we should be friends and communicate with one an- A. REID other.' 3 A century later another letter in Malay was received at the court of France, from a Malay ruler in very different circumstances. Sultan Abdul Jalil of Johor had been chased from his capital by Raja Kecbil in 1718, but hung on in Trengganu until murdered by his victors in 1721. From Trengganu he appealed in vain to the Dutch, the English, and finally the French, to help him regain his fortunes. An English trader, Alexander Hamilton, and a French one, Pierre Villaumont-Gardin, happened both to call at Trengganu in 1719, the Frenchman on route to China. When Sultan Abdul Jalil was discouraged by Hamdlton, he asked Villaumont-Gardin:
if he thought the French nation might be induced to settle in his Dominions, and the French Gentleman gave him Hopes that the King of France might be induced to accept of his Friendship, and settle a Colony, providing he would ceïtify his Request by a Letter, which the King of Johore readily agreed to. 4 The Sultan's letter, which offered in return for assistance as much freedom for French subjects 'as for my own' to trade, settle, and build fortifications, now rests in the Bibliothèque Nationale.
5 It appears to have aroused no interest in France.
By this time French interest in Asia had retreated to the limited Fax Eastern trade of the Compagnie de Chine, the activity of the Missions Étrangères, and above all the long losing battle with the British for control of India. The decisive eighteenth century wars for hegemony in Bengal and the Carnatic depended on the naval strength the rival powers could muster in the Bay of Bengal. As the Indian coast of the Bay became unsafe during the stormy November-December monsoon, the British fleet habitually 'wintered' and refitted in Bombay. French fleets, on the other hand, repeatedly retired either to Mergui or Atjeh, whence they were able to return to the fight in India before the British • fleet could beat around Ceylon. At least as early as 1746 a French fleet made use of Atjeh in this way. 6 The most famous such visit, however, was in 1782, when de Suffren arranged a rendezvous in Atjeh with de Bussy. Even though the two fleets failed to meet in Atjeh bècause of de Bussy's late arrival, de Suffren's fleet alone must have been one of the largest ever to anchor off Atjeh, with eight ships and several thousand men. The reigning Sultan, Ala'ad-din (1781-95), in f act spoke some Erenchand possessed a considerable knowledge of French military tactics, as a result of having spent a month working in the arsenal of Ile de France (Mauritius) as ayoung man. 7 Nevertheless the Sultan and his subjects were understandably alarmed at the French arrival, 'never having seen such substantial forces in their port'. 8 Only by spending freely and keeping a tight control of his crew did de Suffren avoid hostilities. The Atjehnese, the French noted, 'are very jealous of their women, who are nevertheless not temptingly beautiful'. 9 De Suffren's brilliant campaign was the last seriously to threaten British naval superiority in the Indian Ocean. The French nevertheless continued to harass British shipping in Indian and Indonesian waters through daring raids mounted from the Ile de France. Not content with making prizes of British trading vessels, these raiders attacked the East India Company's factories on the West Coast of Sumatra. So poorly were most of these defended that they could be seized for ransom or plunder with hardly more difficulty than an armed vessel.
The way for later privateers was shown by the Naval Admiral Comte d'Estaing, during the seven years' war. In 1760 he seized the principal British post in Indonesia, Fort Marlborough (Bengkulen), as well as its string of dependent settlements along the west coast of Sumatra. The French occupying force was so afflicted by disease, however, that it abandoned Sumatra within a few months. 10 It was during the Revolutionary War, when the French Navy was no longer a force in the Indian Ocean, that Ile de France acquired its reputation as a nid de corsairs through the dashing exploits of privateers like the famous Surcóuf brothers. 11 One of the first in the field was Le Même, who crowned two enormously lucrative privateering expeditions with the capture of Padang in December 1793. The leading Dutch establishment in Sumatra, Padang was still presumed loyal to the Stadtholder. Le Même departed after two weeks' occupation, with a heavy ransom from the burgers and Chinese of Padang. 12 Earlier in the same year three privateers from Ile de France had already attacked the British posts of Bengkulen and Natal while on an abortive expedition against Batavia. 13 In 1794 Natal and Tapanuli were again briefly taken by privateers.
14 When the Napoleonic war began the French Admiral Linois was again quick to attack Sumatra, seizing Bengkulen in December 1803 by the ruse of entering the port under false colours. In four days' occupation he burned the warehouses and all the vessels in the harbour he was unable to take with him. 15 Even as late as 1809, when the balance of naval power was hopelessly against the French, Admiral Hamelin was able to sack the small but prosperous British post at Tapanuli, burning and plundering the whole town.
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This vigorous French activity came to an end with the British capture of Ile de France in December 1810. This was the last and strongest French base east of Suez, and it was not returned after the war. Neighbouring Réunion, returned to French control in 1815, was only gradually developed as an alternative in the 1830s.
Neglected Opportunities
The size and frequency of these naval expeditions must have made Sumatra relatively familiar, at least to French Naval and Colonial circles. Yet it is striking how negligible was the permanent French influence which survived into the nineteenth century. A number of individual Frenchmen, flotsam of the wreek of empire, lived on in Sumatra as renegades 17 ór adventurers, but France possessed neither the strength nor the interest to make any use of them.
The . A. REID At no point, therefore, did France gain any advantage from the activity of its errant sons in Sumatra. Heeres 21 records an abortive French plan in the early eighteenth century to establish trading relations with Atjeh. Subsequently it appears not to have impressed the French Government as it did the British that a permanent base in the Straits of Malacca region would be invaluable both for naval operations in the Indian Ocean and for intra-Asian commercial activity. The first of these assets was süfficiently demonstrated by de Suf f ren; the second had been pointed out as early as the 1740s by the enterprising and persistent Pierre Poivre. OÜier prominent Frenchmen, including the conqueror of Bengkulen, D'Estaing, echoed Poivre's insistence that in addition to obtaining spice plants for cultivation in Ile de France and Bourbon, the French needed a permanent base in Southeast Asia. Only this could provide the goods needed for trade with China, and avoid a ruinous drain of specie from France.
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In contrast to the other Powers, however, France consistently preferred to seek such a base in Mainland Southeast Asia. To serve the needs of the French fleet in the Bay of Bengal Dupleix established a connection with Burma, which was renewed by some of his successors. 23 The proponents of a commercial entrepot to serve the China trade were attracted rather to Vietnam, mainly because of the existing French missionary stake there and the false assumption that island Southeast Asia was already under Spanish or Dutch control. The archipelago remained virtually out of the reckoning, save for an ephemeral interest in Mindanao and Sulu in the 1760s and '70S. 20 Such was the weakness of French seapower that he was sent up the west coast of Sumatra in a small Indonesian prahu, which leaked so much it was forced to land near Bengkulen. De la Hussaye carried letters to the Sultan of Atjeh, presumably designed to facilitate his passage on to Burma. When captured, however, he appears to have thrown the British. of f his real objective by 'admitting' that he had a special mission to Atjeh. The Penang Governor, Macalister, wröte angrily to Sultan Jauhar reporting the capture of 'documents proving the negotiation that has existed between Your Majesty and the French'. 27 It was only a year later that missions sent to Atjeh by the Penang Government revealed the complete lack of interest which even L'Étoile and his fellow Frenchmen had in any connection with France.
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No doubt these fears in Penang sustained Raffles, when in 1810 he insisted that British troops occupy Atjeh as part of his grand strategy for the Malay world. 29 Raffles also used the French bogey more broadiy in his attempt to stimulate an energetic British policy in Southeast Asia. 33 The island came to seem such a centre of stability in an uncertain environment that in 1806 Penang was chosen as the new site for the College Général, the sole seminary of the Society in the Far East, which had led a precarious, shifting existence since its establishment in Ayutia in 1665. 34 However this decision came during the most critical period for the French Missions, curbed and demoralised by Revolutionary anti-clericalism. At times it was struggling to find 3 priests to cover the whole of Siam and the Malay Peninsula. Only after the Bourbon restoration and the Catholic revival of the 1820s was it possible for the mission in Penang to consider new activities.
Although the French missionaries steadily expanded their work among the npn-Malay population of Malaya throughout the nineteenth century, Sumatra was the first part of the Malay world to attract the enthusiasm of the missionary revival. In 1826 a new Vicar Apostolic, Florens, was asking for a priest to send to Atjeh. This peculiar idea came from the bishop of Pondichéry, who must have picked up some loose talk from French pepper-traders. 35 But the isolated, still animistic island of Nias, off Sumatra's west coast, attracted more serious attention.
It was Jean-Baptiste Boucho, later to become the first Vicar Apostolic of the Malayan Peninsula (1845), whose enthusiasm gave rise to the Nias venture. He came into contact with Nias slaves and ex-slaves soon after his arrival in Penang in 1824, and baptised about thirty of them. Ahnost half were the windfall of the British judicial system: Last year some Chinese traders brought a large number of these unfortunate Nias here to sell them; as this trade is forbidden by the English laws the dealers were arrested and put into prison, but to condemn them witnesses were necessary, and there were only these very Nias who could testify to the fact. The difficulty was that the Nias knowing nothing of a future life or of the punishments reserved for pagans could not be admitted by the law to the oath.... Without losing time, I asked the government for authority to instruct these people, which was given me the more easily because the government had no other means than that to bring the affair to a successful conclusion. By means of the Nias who were already Ghristian, these new compatriots were so well instructed, to the great satisfaction of the court which had them examined by the grand jury. All got their liberty. There were 10 girls and 3 boys. The girls were already Christian, and 4 of them are married to 4 new Chinese Christians. The boys will be baptised at Pentecost.
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Boucho could not sufficiently praise his Niassers, 'good, simple, faithful, and very attached to their faith once Christian'. From them he learned enough to compile half a Nias dictionary and write a few prayers in the language. Boucho was delighted to discover that they already recognised a beneficent creator God, 'Laubalangi', although they directed most of their ritual to placating the evil spirit, named 'Cekhou'. Their moral code was very strict, adultery and fornication being punished with death.
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Despite Boucho's keen desire to go to Nias, however, he could not be spared from the College at Penang, and the task feil to two young priests. Jean-Pierre Vallon, ordained only after his arrival in Penang in August 1831, caught Boucho's enthusiasm to such an extent that the Vicar could not oppose 'so obvious a vocation' for Nias. His companion, Jean-Laurent Bérard, appears to have joined the mission. partly because of difficulties experienced in Penang. best tö convert Vallon and his party to Islam. At Trumon they enconntered a state of war between the Radja and his subjects. By the time they reached the first Dutch port, Tapanuli (now Sibolga), the whole party was ill and Sophie was out of her mind.
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The original plan had been to travel first to the main Dutch centre at Padang, to establish a Ghristian bridgehead among its five or six thousand Nias (mainly slave) residents. Having returned to health in Tapanuli and neighbouring Natal, however, Vallon was eager to go straight to Nias ratiier than risk further mishaps in travel. Bérard alone therefore continued the journey south to Padang. 40 Ignoring warnings from the Dutch military, whose experience in Nias had been particularly dismal, Vallon sailed with Francisco for the main trading and slaving port, Gunung Sitoli, in March 1832. Vallon improved his knowledge of the language, travelled through several villages and baptised a few children, bef ore dying of unknown causes in June 1832. Bérard, 'tout écrasé', received this mournful news as he lay with fever in Natal preparing to rejoin his colleague. 41 Nevertheless he proceeded to Gunung Sitoli, where he died within a few days. Both priests were just 30. A sympathetic merchant, Bérard's host in Padang, described what little was known of their death:
Our friends already spoke enough Nias on their arrival in that island to make the poor islanders understand that their mission was entirely peaceful -that they in no way came to oppress them -on the contrary that it was for their spiritual & temporal good. They were weÜ received by the inhabitants, who are not as bad as people say, which aroused the jéalousy of their chiefs and of the Muslims, and it is suppqsed that as a result they were poisoned. 42 The accusation of poisoning was treated with great scepticism by this merchant, Embrecht. Subsequently, however, it assumed the status of fact in the official record 43 by the efforts of Dutch officials anxious to emphasise the violence of Nias, and pious recorders seeking to add the halo of martyrdom to the heroic mission of these young priests. Poison is not mentioned by the American Cóngregationalist Lyman, the oiily öther contemporary missionary to visit Nias. Lyman was in and around Gunung Sitoli for two weeks of Junè 1834, just before his ówn 39 Vallon to Boucho, 1-21 January 1832, S.M.E. 888, ff. 267-72. 40 They were, from all we learn, monkish, clownish enthusiasts. Their pay was but one hundred Spanish dollars per annum, and they were miserably fitted out. They, however, refused all assistance for themselves, but willingly received old clothes from the officers, to give to the Nyas. 44 One of them embarked at Padang, 45 in a little open boat, which, after he had put in his own baggage, scarcely contained room for himself. He arrived at Gunung Stollis [Gunung Sitoli], and was kindly received by Messam [a Christian from Tapanuli, resident in Gunung Sitoli and married to a high-born Nias], who offered him his own house. But he chose rather to erect a little miserable open shed, on the hill, near the house of a petty chief. He visited among the people, and obtained a child of that chief as his pupil; but in a short time took a f ever, and died. His servant, also, had the same fever, but returned soon after to Padang, and resided a while with Mr. Embrecht. This man was hardly dead, and his goods sealed up, ere the other came, having embarked at Natal, where he had been to visit the upper stations of the Dutch. But the fever was already upon him, and he only landed at Gunong Stolis, to linger out eight or ten days, and go to his final account.
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The Société des Missions Étrangères did not abandon hope of Nias. It sent three more French priests to renew the work on better-prepared foundations in 1834. Problems of ecclesiastical jurisdiction had already arisen, however, and the priests sailed to Padang via Batavia, where they became involved with the Dutch Vicar Apostolic of Batavia and the colonial bureaucracy. Roman Catholic clergy had been officially permitted to enter Netherlands India only since 1808, and then under stringent conditions. They were forbidden to proselytise among Indonesians under Dutch control. The three priests encountered consistent official, pressure to divert their attentions from Nias to the European population of Sumatra.
Until the French missionary initiative, no Dutch priest appears to have visited Sumatra. Vallon and Bérard had discovered that over half the two thousand or more Dutch soldiers in West Sumatra for the 'Padri' War were Roman Catholic, mainly óf Belgian origin. Most lived with Indonesian women, but according to Bérard they were prepared to regularise these unions if their mistresses could be instructed and baptised. Dutch law prevented their marriage to non-Christians. 44 Bérard had pleaded for cloth to be sent from Penang, because he feared 'their state of nudity would make them unapproachable'. it is impossible for foreigners to penetrate the island without suffering death or at least being sold into slavery; and until this island is occupied by troops, any foreigner who wants to enter it will perish without fail.
48
Worse still, Fr. Candalph proposed the 'almost certain' alternative method of buying Nias slaves in Padang, to be educated in servility as priests or catechists. While awaiting approval, Candalph and Galabert remained in Padang serving the European Catholics and baptising their illegitimate children. The Dutch Vicar Apostolic of Batavia made his first visit to Sumatra in November, 1834, and formally appointed Candalph Vicar of Padang. The French priests left Sumatra six months later, however, when the Dutch Governor-General continued to oppose their presence. 49 This close identification with an unpopular colonial power brought to an end not only French but all effective Catholic missionary work in Sumatra for a century.
The Dutch duly occupied Gunung Sitoli in 1840, and brought fire and sword to the surrounding area in 1863. Not surprisingly the process of Christianising Nias, begun by the Rhenische (Lutheran) Mission in the wake of this conquest, was painfully slow.
Tradèrs and Gunboats
The French Government appears to have had no connection whatever with this missionary initiative in Sumatra. It was only thé rapid expansion of French commercial activity in the area in the 1820s and '30s which attracted serious official interest in Paris.
In the closing years of the eighteenth century a remarkable development of pepper cultivation had begun in the southernmost dependencies óf the Atjeh Sultanate on the west coast of Sumatra. By 1820 this region had corae to furnish about half the world's supply of pepper. While the Dutch and British still strüggled to extract smaller amounts from their declining stations farther south under conditions of monopoly and forced labpur, private traders flocked to buy this Atjehnese pepper. New England vessels took the lion's share, but Arab, Indian, Penang (British and Chinese), and French ships were all participating by the 1820s. In 1823 four large French ships were reported to have taken cargoes of pepper from the coast, as against twenty-seven American vessels.
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Twenty years later the French were considered to occupy third place behind Americans and British. Nine or ten of their vessels visited Penang each year, and most of them went on to Atjeh to collect pepper. 62 , Successful trading on the Atjeh coast depended on fluency in Malay, if. npt Atjehnese, familiarity with the dangerous coast and its numerous tiny ports, and contacts with the Atjehnese riders and traders who controlled the pepper. Those who acquired this special knowledge tended to spend a good part of their lives in the trade. With the development of Penang as an entrepot they pften used it as a base for multiple trips to Atjeh during one voyage from France. One example is provided by the most well-known and respected French trader of the period, Captain Martin of Marseilles. 53 Martin recommended that instead of burning market villages, which caused little loss to the Atjehnese, the gunboats should seize and destroy the boats of the offending port, which were always well-stocked with arms and money. On the positive side, the captain suggested that the French should capitalise on the fear of retribution of the Atjehnese around Meuké to demand the cession of part of the coast as a trading base. The Atjehnese, he claimed, were convinced that, in contrast with the upstart Americans, the French, 'first among the white races', would exact a terrible punishment. Moreover the contemporary Dutch attacks on Atjehnese border settlements just south of this pepper coast made the need for protection clear to all. 50 The Governor of Bourbon received Martin's suggestion with some enthusiasm, sending the brig Le Lancier a few months behind La Dordogne to show the flag on the Atjeh coast and investigate the prospects for some sort of base. Stressing the poor state of French commerce in the Malay world, and the rapid expansion of British and Dutch territories there, he urged 'Paris to move quickly to establish a base on some part of Sumatra not yet occupied by Holland. 57 This opportunity struck France at a moment of greatly revived interest in the Far East in general and the Malay world in particular. As her economie and naval strength gradually returned, France was alarmed 55 Idem, f. 245. 56 to discover the extent and continued growth of British commercial predominance in the East.' The 'well-nigh desperate concern' of the regimes which ruled France af ter 1830 to recover international greatpower status gave rise to an unaccustomed eargerness to come to the aid of French traders and missionaries. 58 So limited was the existing French stake in Asian trade that the pepper-traders of the Atjeh coast were seized upon with gratitude. In Bourbon the Chamber of Commerce claimed wishfully that French commerce predominated on the Sumatra coast.
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Nothing did more to bring home to the French the growing value of the Far Eastern trade, and the key role which Singapore played in this for the British, than the activity of Adolphe Barrot as first French Consul in Manila (1835-8). He proved a splendid propagandist for the commercial attractions of Southeast Asia. On-leave in 1839 he succeeded in winning his Government and a number of leading commercial houses throughout France to a broad strategy to break into the burgeoning trade of the East. He was sent back as Consul General for 'Indochine' (meaning all Southeast Asia), based at Manila. His deputy Eugène Chaigneau, a veteran of lengthy and abortive negotiations in Annam, was to be based in Singapore, where he did not obtain an exequatur as first French Consul until 1840. The Dutch would allow no Consul in Batavia, but Barrot appointed a French merchant there as 'correspondent'. Another agent was installed in Macao. From all of these sources, but particularly from Chaigneau in Singapore, a stream of information was provided about the commercial • possibilities of the region. Barrot and Chaigneau agreed, however, that the best way to compete with the British in Singapore and the Dutch in Batavia was to establish a comparable French base in Southeast Asian waters.
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For a few months following the receipt of Martin's report and that of the Bourbon Governor, the possibility of acquiring territory in Sumatra for a French Naval and commercial base was actively considered in Paris. By early 1841, however, the Ministries involved (Affaires Étrangères, Marine et Colonies, Commerce) had all agreed that this was impracticable in view of French cordiality towards the Netherlands, which had already manifested its 'pretensions . 
The period of official French concern with the Malay world was thus fairly brief, between about 1839 and 1845. Initiatives taken during this period were of more lasting significance, however. The chair of Malay which had been neglected at the beginning of the century was finally established in 1844, as a result of the Foreign Minister's insistence on the necessity 'of facilitating the teaching in France of a language as widespread as Malay is from the Cape of Good Hope to New Guinea and the north of the Philippines', especially when France was engaged in strengthening its commercial and political links with Southeast Asia. Before La Magicienne's arrival, Sultan Ibrahim had already given Captain Martin a letter for King Louis-Philippe, 'who rules with justice the city of Marseilles'. The Sultan appealed to an alliance between France. and Atjeh which hehad heard existed in the time of his grandfather. 67 He sought to revive this imaginary alliance in view of the seemingly relentless Dutch advance on the West Coast, where they had already taken Singkil and Barus (1839-40) at Atjeh'sexpense. Ibrahim was convinced:
• we will have to fight the Dutch because they want to occupy our Kingdom. Nevertheless, with the help of God, we will yield them no part of it. What concerns us particularly in this matter is the ability of the Dutch on the sea, whereas we do notknow how to fight there. We therefore come to ask help of our friend... If he helps us to gain the victory, we will give him a base wherever it suits him. We make known further to our friend, regarding the merchant ships which come from the Kingdom of Frarice, which is under his dominion, that he should order them to visit our Kingdom [i.e. the capital, Banda Atjeh] so that we can give them the permission and the facilities to sail wherever they wish to trade. If, after having come to Atjeh, they are subsequently robbed, we undertake formally to be responsible to them for the value of all the goods lost. This is what I have to say to our magnificent ally. A. REID Ibrahim's demand that the European powers invoke the authority of the Atjehnese sovereign, rather than settling mattere directly with his vassals, was a consistent one throughout the nineteenth century. Although perfectly within his rights in pointing this out to French, British, American and Dutch alike, the Sultan was too weak to enforce it. It suited the Western traders to avoid entanglements with the Sultanate and remain free to play off the powerless pepper-producing tributaries of the West Coast against one another. The Americans, despite the great value of their trade with Atjeh throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, appear never to have had any formal relations with the Sultanate in this period. The French similarly preferred to avoid the capital until after receipt of Ibrahim's letter. Only in February 1843 did the Corvette La Fortune call at Banda Atjeh in the course of a detailed investigation of North Sumatra and Pegu, called fór by the Minister of the Navy and the Colonies. The Governor of Bourbon had also commissioned its commander, Le Comte, to encourage French commerce, in particular by obtaining Atjehnese acceptance of the French 5 Franc piece.
On his preliminary tour of the West Coast ports Le Comte was repeatedly referred to the capital on the question of currency -mainly, one may assume, as a polite way of avoiding having to point out the difficulty of disposing of French coins, in contrast to the popular Spanish silver dollar. On the other hand he found the rulers of the states nearest to the 'Dutch garrison of Singkil more emphatic than ever in their desire for French protection. Bulo Samah and Trumon, where the leading men of Singkil had settled after failing in its defence, had a particular hatred of the Dutch:
They told me formally that their greatest desire is that France should take them under its protection, and that they wanted to be French. 69 In Banda Atjeh Le Comte was received with great formality but little warmth. Sultan Ibrahim undertook to do his best to have French coins accepted, and replied to Le Comte's greeting in' the name of the Governor of Bourbon by saying That formerly there had been good relations of friendship between his country and France, and that it did not depend upon him to have them re-established. The question of the sack of Seunagan was discreetly sidestepped at the royal audience on February 25. The following day, however, the Shahbandar and the Sultan's secretary made clear to Le Comte that Ibrahim remained upset about the attack on Seunagan, and repeated the demand diat French vessels caJl first at Banda Atjeh before trading on the coast. 71 Le Comte would have fared much better had he brought some answer to Sultan Ibrahim's letter of 1840. Consistent with the arbitrariness which appeared to govern all France's actions in Sumatra, however, a reply was written only in January 1843, when La Fortune was already on its way to Atjeh. Louis-Philippe himself then signed a gracious letter expressing his desire for closer relations, and for the Sultan's continued protection of French trading vessels.
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Ibrahim was accustomed to receiving letters from the British Governor of the Straks Settlements, or the Dutch Governor of Padang. This was the first time that he, or any of his predecessors since the 17th century, had received a friendly letter from a European Head of State. Not surprisingly the impressive letter, which appears to have been delivered by a warship, was one of the few documents safely preserved in the Atjehnese palace until the Dutch conquest of 1874. It appears also to have disposed Ibrahim to regard the. little-known French as perhaps his most promising potential ally.
Well before the French monarch had signed this letter, the Quai d'Orsay had decided against the possibility of establishing a naval station in Atjeh. Yet the short-lived period of official interest had made an impression on some of the French pepper-traders, who may in addition have been sounded out by the Sultan when they visited Banda Atjeh. In 1845 Noel Berchou of Nantes, an Atjeh pepper-trader for fifteen years, resurrected the issue with the foreign ministry. He claimed to possess great influence in Atjeh, where the Sultan and his chiefs 'have often manifested to me the desire they have to be under the protection of the French King'. 73 Berchou was politely turned down, and seemed to be growing more desperate by the following year, when the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce was informed that Berchou was planning to 'sell' his interests in Atjeh tothe British, having been rejected by his own government. 74 Sultan Ibrahim did not reply formally to Louis-Philippe's letter until early 1849. Taking advantage of the intended pilgrimage to Mecca of Muhammad Ghauth, a wealthy nephew of the ulèëbalang of Meulaboh distanüy related to the ruling house, Ibrahim entrusted him with two further important missions. He was to carry to Constantinople an appeal for diplomatic and military support on the basis of Atjeh's strong sentimental and religious ties with Turkey. At the same time he was to journey to Paris to present a letter to Louis Napoleon, whom he addressed as 'PadukaSri Sultan Republic Peranchis'.
Ibrahim's letter to the French President began with gratitude for the letter of Louis Philippe, promised that French coins would be accepted, and repeated the request that French traders call first at Banda Atjeh for a safé-conduct. But Ibrahim had pressing needs of his own:
May you give me a warship or if possible two, so that I can control the people of each state and town. If there is a warship all the ulèëbalangs will certainly be afraid of me. Regarding payment for this ship I have the necessary goods, but I wish to postpone payment if possible for two years. Once this period is up I will pay you the price. Please ensure the ship is complete with equipment.
Furthermore I ask your great mercy, because iny country has been taken by the Dutch. There are two or three towns, beginning with Airbangis and extending to Singkil as well as the island Nias, which have been taken by the Dutch because these coüntries are rather far from Atjeh. May it be by your prayer and your decision that the Dutch are removed from all these states.
The Sultan's letter ended widi a statement of complete confidence in Muhammad Ghauth as his plenipotentiary. 75 The embassy of Muhammad Ghauth produced striking results at both the French and Turkish courts, each of which appears to have seized eagerly upon this exotic evidence of its international status. The envoy proceeded from Mecca to Constantinople sometime in 1850, to find Sultan Abdul Mejid highly gratified with the homage he brought from such a distant 'vassal'. The Turkish Sultan issued two firmans renewing his ancient 'protectorate' over Atjeh. Mühammad Ghauth was given a recommeridation to the Khedivë in Egypt, while the Turkish Governor of Yemen was instructed to send the envoy on to Atjeh. 76 This royal treatment must have precluded the continuation of Mühammad Ghauth's mission to Paris, quite apart from practical difficülties of money and language. While in Cairo on his return joürney in 1852, therefore, he entrusted Sultan Ibrahim's letter to the French Consul, along with his own apology for his 'inability to come in person'."
'Louis Napoleon, however, was obviously flattered to receive a letter from this obscure oriental kingdom, particularly in the honorific French into which the oriëntalist Desgranges rendered the rather casual original. 78 He authorised Ghauth's journey to Paris as a guest of the government, while 5,000 Francs were set aside for his expenses in France. 79 Whether the envoy was still in Cairo to receive this reply is not clear. However the Atjehnese who took advantage of the offer, who was escorted around Paris by Foreign Ministry officials, and who was finally received by the Prince-President on 31 October 1852^ was cjearly not Mühammad Ghauth. It was his young writer Teuku Nyak Adum, who became known in France as Sidi Mühammad. Perhaps the French did not care. In any case they did not appear to realise the. mistake until af ter the envoy's departure. Meanwhile he and an Atjehnese companion lived in France at government expense for almost a year, before being sent back to Atjeh in Janüary 1853 with a magnificent sword as a present from Napoleon to Sultan Ibrahim.
The incident naturally created some alarm in The Hague, which was little accustomed to such flamboyant imperial gestures. The Dutch need not have worried. As they were told, the Atjehnese visit was simply 'a matter of curiosity'. 80 lts only political significance was the exotic embellishment it was intended to give to the court of the Prince-President -soon to be Emperor. The honour of transporting 'Sidi Muhammad' back to Sumatra was given, in January 1853, to Noel Berchou, the Nantes pepper-trader who had earlier claimed such influence in Atjeh. He became increasingly suspicious about the envoy's credentials, and finally discovered his real identity upon arrival in Atjeh. Berchou appeared not to be amused, complaining that 'Sidi' had even tried to swindle Mm in a pepper transaction. 81 The Sidi Muhammad affair ended official French relations with the " independent rulers of Sumatra. Like the missionaries earlier, the French Government henceforth conducted its relations exclusively through the Dutch as overlords. In 1856 a f uil-time French Consul for Sumatra was sent to the seat of the Dutch Governor at Padang, over thirty years earlier than any other foreign consul in the island. The appointment to a small Dutch garrison town must have originated with the interest of the previous decade in the Atjehnese pepper trade. It is characteristic of French relations with Sumatra, however, that • the only period of official French representation was also one of exceptionally low French involvement. During the 1850s French pepper ships virtually ceased to visit Sumatra as the market for Atjeh pepper shifted to Penang, served by regular steam lines. Until the Consulate's abolition in 1865, successive Consuls had nothing with which to fill their time except an occasional report on Dutch military activity and a continuing squabble to establish their diplomatic privileges. 82 The task of reviving French commercial interest was obviously hopeless. The last and most interesting of the Consuls, Le Comte A. de Pina, pointed out that Dutch policies made it impossible for any European merchant to survive in their Sumatran possessions. 83 Although de Pina collected some interesting material on Sumatra, it was only after the revival of French interest during the 1870s that he was able to find a publisher for it. His book was remarkable for its final chapter, in which he advanced the cause of Malay as the great lingua franca of Asia. Instead of struggling tö master Vietnamese, Thai expand it in our East Asian possessions, encourage its study at home, and make it obligatory for officials destined for colonial service.
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The Atjeh-Dutch War, 1873
The interest France had shown in Atjeh in the early 1850s was. ephemeral, like that of Turkey. Both countries had forgotten Atjeh's existence within a few years. But despite the absence of continuing relations, Atjeh continued to regard these two Powers as the most promising potential source of help against the Dutch. About 1862 Sultan Ibrahim asked an Italian adventurer at his court, Cesar Moreno, to look to France in the first instance for a defensive treaty against the Dutch.
85 When Habib Abdur-Rahman az-Zahir came to guide Atjeh's foreign relations after 1870, it was again France and Turkey which he looked upon with greatest favour. The Habib even claimed in his memoirs to have been twioe in France, Qnce in his youth and once as Atjehnese envoy in 1873. 86 When in November 1873 it became clear to Atjehnese leaders that the Dutch were determined to establish their power over Atjeh by one means or another, there was a considerable burst of diplomatic activity. On the one hand the royal favourite Muhammad Tibang was sent to Singapore to try to delay Dutch overtures while sounding out the representatives of the major European powers. Britain had already proved a disappointment. The importance of France in Atjehnese hopes was indicated by the fact that Tibang carried one royal letter specifically addressed to the Consul of France, and another open letter to serve the consuls of all the other powers. However Tibang appéars to have been persuaded ih Singapore to by-pass the unsympathetic French Consul in favour of the American. In the panicky mood into which the Netherlands was thrown prior tó the declaration of war on Atjeh, and still more af ter the Dutch expedition had retreated from Atjeh in defeat on April 25, the slightest indications of foreign support for Atjeh were wildly exaggerated. France, along with Italy, America, Turkey and Britain, was momentarily suspect. But of all these states France went to the greatest lengths to assure The Hague of full support in the war. While Britain and America attempted to pursue at least a formal neutrality, President Thiers wrote personally to The Hague to convey his confident prayers, 'that Dutch arms may establish their legitimate ascendéncy in the Indies'. If, he added, 'the Sultan of Atjeh had the singular idea of addressing himself to us, he would be abruptly repudiated'.
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Consistently with this policy Thier's successor MacMahon refused to reply to a written appeal of July 1873 from Teuku Paya, an Atjèhnese leader in Penang, complaining about the false accusations of the Dutch. The letter was immediately shown to the Dutch Government. 80 The French Ambassador in Constantinople, similarly, was instructed to advise Turkey to drop its plans for mediation in the war. 01 Having at last recovered its role as a colonial power in Asia, France was no longer interested in flirting with the peripheries of the Dutch empire. The Government could now find no paxticular French interest in North Sumatra beyond the 'chaos of piracy' which it feared would result from an Atjèhnese victory. 92 Policy was therefóre governed- exclusively by friendship with Holland and 'solidarity 'among all the countries of Europe in regard to their eastern policies', to see that European 'prestige' was maintained. 93 The Geographical Movement ', . . . .
For French governments of the 1870s Continental strategy was paramount. The pursuit of effective colonial schemes had to be sacrifïced to the all-consuming demand to make good the humiliation of 1871 j and to heal the wounds of the Paris commune. The overwhelming public sentiment was against wasting on expensive colonies resources which could be used for the task of national survival in Europe.
A minority of French intellectuals and businessmen, on the other hand, reacted quite differently, seeking salvation overseas from the disaster suffered in Europe. The vehicle for such views was the geographical movement. Geographical societies blossomed throughout Europe in the. 1870s, but in France they became an obsèssion. The hïtherto austere Société de Geographie in Paris opened the way by announcing in 1871 that it would no longer limit itself to pure scholarship, but would pursué the more urgent imperative of demonstrating a new and successful. foreign role for French enterprise. Within three years the society doubled in membership, and before the end of the decade it had spawned a dozen geographical societies in the pro vinces. The recipe under which these societies flourished was a blend, as Mackay puts it,' of 'national honor, scientific interests, and commercial prosperity'. 84 Frenchmen must be marie aware of the dazzling commercial and civilising opportunities that awaited them in Africa and the East. By supporting exploration and colonisation Frenchmen were serving science, commerce and the Fatherland all at once.
One of the most interesting off-shoots of the movement was the Société de Geographie Commerciale, which resulted from a commission formed in 1874 by the Société de Geographie on the one hand-and the Paris Chambers of Commerce on the other. By 1876 it had assumed a separate life, dedicated to placing the latest scientific knowledge of foreign places at the disposal of French commerce. Among its first projects was to préparé a map of the globe showing every place where Frenchmen resided and where the French government was represented.
A. REID
Although the principal emphasis of the movement was Africa, the opportunities for France in the Far East were not forgotten. The most ambitious Asian venture arising from the Paris Société de Géographie was the formation of a task force called the colons explorateurs, to establish an experimental commercial colony in the East as a base for further scientific and commercial work. The founder and moving spirit of this project, Brau de Saint-Pol Lias, 90 proclaimed the manifesto of the group as follows: the true way to study a country seriously is to support exploration upon colonial establishment^ which allow it all the length of time, all the continuity which it nqust have, all'the security which it must enjoy; just as the way to harvest all the fruits of exploration is to have the exploration radiate from these establishments, to place, behind the explorers, colonists of which they are the avant-garde, • who can profit from their discoveries, take root were they have penetrated, and push them yet further afield.
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The enthusiasm of Brau de St-Pol Lias for his vision of a revived expansionist France was tireless and infectious. One of die instigators of die Société de Géographie Commcrciale, he was convinced that France could only return to her traditional place of honour among nations by forging a new vigour in the fires of overseas adventure:
Colonization is the most effective spring from which the powers of a péople can be refreshed. It not only produces wealth: it makes men vigorous and energetic; it tempers characters.
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He never ceased to denounce the argument that Frenchmen lacked the aptitude for colonization, or the adaptability to foreign languages and customs. Every example to the contrary is emphasised in his books. 86 Francois-Xavier-Joseph-Honoré Brau de Saint-Pol Lias (1840-1914) trained as a lawyer in Paris, and worked for five years (1868-73) in the Banque de France. Thereafter he devoted hiinself entirely to publicising the geographical and colonial movements. A prominent member of the Paris Société de Géo-graphie, he was also a founder of the Société des Etudes coloniales et maritimes (1873), and the Société de Géographie Commerciale. The convening by the latter society of a Congres Internationale de géographie commerciale in 1878 was largely at his initiative. He founded various French companies to operate in Sumatra, Malaya and Indo-China, and travelled to Java and Sumatra (1876-7); Sumatra and Malaya (1880-1); and Burma, Indo-China and Malaya (1884). His numerous writings depict the opportunities in these countries in glowing colours. 97 Indeed, he argued in a fascinating extension of Hobsonian logic, it was not only the need to dispose of excess manufactures which demanded that Europe acquire Asian colonies, but the problem of excess talent, education and leadership. Capable men 'finding nothing to organise at home... are led by a fatal necessity into disorganising something'.
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The disastrous deficiency in France was not talent, but a firm colonial policy. Unlike many of his colleagues in the geographical movement, however, Brau's concern was not limited to the expansion of French territory. Colonization to him was the Work of individuals and firms as much as governments. France, like Germany before her, would draw great benefit from the commercial ventures of her sbns in foreign colonies. Equally, like Holland, she would gain from possessing colonial territories even if they were exploited by foreigners. 100 Resentful of British attempts to curb French expansion while fattening on her own Empire, Brau was nevertheless a Europeanist in his approach to colonization. His bitterest denunciations of Britain were because of her refusal to ,co-operate with the 'patriotisme de race' which was his vision for Europe in its dealings with Asia.
101
For these reasons Brau's first commercial adventures were directed to the newest and apparently richest possessions of the Netherlands and Britain, rather than to French territory. Brau saw himself as a French pioneer at the colonial frontier, whose efforts would bring wealth, prestige, and the growing stimulus of foreign adventure to France without necessarily extending her territory.
As an initial experimental base for the colons explorateurs Brau selected the booming new plantation district of East Sumatra, centred around the minor sultanate of Deli. The remarkable suitability of this area for tobacco-growing had been demonstrated just a decade earlier by the Dutch planter Nienhuys. Despite numerous last-minute defections Brau eventually brought together a half-dozen enthusiastic Frenchmen, who subscribed their own capital for the expedition of which they formed the members. There was a young mining engineer, Wallon; an even younger 'agriculturalist', Tabel, and his assistant; a doctor; and a few non-specialists. After two difficult months in Java obtaining the necessary Dutch official backing, they succeeded in marking out a plantation in the last months of 1876. Their concession was in remote A. REID Bedagai, bordering Batu Bara and Simelungun Batak territory. At that time it was well to the south of the recognised frontier of the tobacco plantation area of Deli.
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: For two years this tobacco plantation cut from the virgin jungle at Bedagai struggled on. The first erop was good, the second disappointing. But it was not the continuing routine of finding labour, planting, and harvesting that called to these romantic French hearts, but the lure of diseóvery.' Within six months of arrival the colons-explorateurs had already fallen out with each other in their rush for the fabled gold of Sumatra..
The Quest for Atjeh Gold
Gold is-present at many points of the mountain ridge running down the western side of Sumatra, and has been exploited throughout historie times. For the éarly Portuguese Minangkabau had been the best-known centre of gold production. Further north, Atjeh had also exploited the alluvial gold of the mountain ridge since at least the 17th century. The richest area in Atjeh was the federation of ulèëbalangships known-as Kawaj XII, at the headwaters of the Teunom and Wojla rivers, whose population had been principally occupied in panning for gold until the nineteenth century pepper-boom drew them nearer the West coast. About 1840 the ruler of Seunagan, further south, also encoüraged two hundred Chinese to work the alluvial gold in the higher reaches of his river, although their efforts were ultimately thwarted by disease. 103 The existence of gold in these areas was never a secret. In 1877 a brochure was published in Amsterdam arguing that the gold in the mountain backbone of Sumatra was potentially as rich as the Californian and Australian fields, though since it had been worked for centuries there would be no windfalls for the casual surface prospector. 104 However the dramatic and widely-reported Dutch setbacks in attemptihg to conquer Atjeh after 1873 tended to inflate the idea of spectacular riches awaiting the conqueror. The coloris-explorateurs very probably had their attention drawn to West Atjeh gold by Édouard Roura, the only French sea captain still operating in Sumatran waters. Although of Spanish origin Roura had been naturalised in Marseilles, and had traded in Atjeh pepper since the 1850s with his base in Penang. At the outbreak of the Atjeh war he was considered to be the European trader best acqiiainted with Atjeh, speaking Atjehnese and having close relations with the ulèëbalangs of the West Coast pepper-growing states -especially Paté. Habib AbdurRahman, the regent of Atjeh, was his friend. The Dutch wooed him with special exemption from their blockade, and later by chartering his vessel the Patty, in return for his information and his influence. But Roura was too well aware of Atjehnese determination to resist to give the Dutch much pleasure. He constantly 'stressed the need for negotiation, and feil increasingly out of favour with a government committed to military victory. By 1876 he was very embittered against the Dutch, whom he feit had given him inadequate compensation for the loss of his pepper trade and the help he had provided.
During the early months of 1877 the mining engineer of the 'colons explorateurs', Wallon, toured Teunom and Wojla, quite possibly with the help of Roura who made a voyage to the coast in late January. 105 Wallon must have obtained the support at least of Teuku Imam Muda of Teunom, the most important ulèëbalang of the area, who was just then negotiating his submission to the Dutch.
Despite his inability on this visit to cope with water seepage into his experimental diggings, Wallon became insatiably eager to return to exploit the fabled gold. 100 He immediately set about organising a largescale expedition on his own account, setting off a bitter disagreement with Brau de St-Pol Lias, 'which ended all relations between us'.
107 By November of 1877 Wallon had found his own financial backing in Paris and returned to Singapore with another engineer,. Moulle, and a businessman, Pillard. In a clumsy attempt to deceive the Dutch, the group claimed to be going to West Atjeh to buy pepper and establish an agricultural enterprise. Evidently they were foolish enough to think that if they succeeded in negotiating mineral agreements with the local rulers, the Dutch would then be reluctantly obliged to accept their pre-emption of the fabulous wealth they envisaged there. In reality Dutch officials in West Atjeh had no illusions about Wallon's intentions, and commended his enterprise. 108 Nevertheless the Frenchmen were not allowed in to the Teunom area in late 1877, to their intense annoyance, because the Dutch could offer no security whatever.
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The colons explorateurs did not long survive the dispute over gold. Brau left the East Sumatran plantation for Paris about March 1877. He hoped to find additional finance to enable 'him to use the plantation as the base for exploiting West Atjeh gold. However he had little control over the other colons explorateurs, who had contributed their own funds and envisaged more spectacular roles for themselves than planting tobacco. Most of the group drifted back to France. Brau failed to find in Paris the money to keep Tabel going, and when his own resources were exhausted in 1878 the experiment had to be abandoned. Tabel remained in Deli as the chief assistant on the only other French plantation in Sumatra -that of the two brothers De Guigné, from Réunion. 110 In 1886 Tabel organised finance in Paris for his own Société de tabac de Deli, but this too failed within a few years because of the poor location of its concession. By the beginning of 1880 Brau had succeeded at least in forming 'an embryo of this company', the aims of which would be to demonstrate the practicability of his new vision. 113 The most spectacular profits now seemed to be in minerals rather than agriculture, however. companion was therefore a mining engineer, M. J. Errington de la Croix, with whom he left Toulon in January 1880. The first objective was the gold of Atjeh, 'one of the richest countries in the world, and still one of the least known'.
114 Failing this, they would explore the tin resources of Malaya or the minerals of Borneo.
Although conditions in West Atjeh were hardly very different in 1880 from 1877, the Dutch attitude had chariged. Desperately short of men, money, and national will to go on killing Atjehnese, the Netherlands was anxious to prove to itself and the world, despite most of the evidence, that the war was really over. 110 In response to Dutch statements to this effect, Brau's party and that of Wallon began at the end of 1879 a race to reach the hitherto forbidden eldorado in West Atjeh.
Wallon made sure of being the winner. Accompanied by, Guilhaume, another mining engineer, and Courret, the son of the principal financier of his party, he arrived in Singapore a few weeks before Brau. After a short period obtaining the necessary approval in Batavia, Wallon took a steamer to Padang and then a small Atjehnese prahu from there north to Meulaboh, instead of following the orthodox steam route via Penang and Ulèëlheuë. When Brau and Errington de la Croix reached Singapore on 1 March 1880, Wallon's party was already at Meulaboh.
Wallon's relationship with Dutch officialdom was a crude caricature of^ Brau's. Brau and Errington, although officially entrusted by the Ministry of Public Instruction with a mission scientifique, made clear to Dutch officials that they regarded the quest for an economically viable enterprise as the more important object of their journey.
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Wallon lacked these scholarly credentials, but engaged in an elaborate pretence that his haste to reach Atjeh and explore the gold-bearing regions was 'animated by a fervent love for science'. 117 The French Consul was alarmed lest in being discovered Wallon would involve the French in great embarrassment, especially as he was smuggling several rifles in as gifts for the radjas with whom he wanted to sign contracts.
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Dutch officials, however, appear to have decided to play along with both French teams. 114 Ibid., p. 44. 115 Far from terminating the French quest for Atjeh gold, the death of these two rash explorers increased the certainty of their colleagues that the forbidden fruit was of surpassing delicacy. Brau and Errington arrived in Atjeh at the beginning of April, hot on the heels of their illfated rivals. They were in time to join the expedition which the Dutch military Governor sent to the area to 'avenge' the death of the Frenchmen. As usual with such expeditions, the principal result was simply to worsen relations between the Dutch and Teuku Imam Muda of Teunom, who by the strange logic of accessibility was held responsible. 120 It also meant that the Dutch forbade further French ventures into the politically uncertain interior of West Atjeh.
Brau de Saint-Pol Lias, always assiduous at cultivating his connections in high places, quickly re-established good relations with the local Dutch officials. The Assistant-Resident for the West Coast, Van Langenj took the two Frenchmen with him to all the important West.Coast ports as far soudi at Tapak Tuan, and described in grandiose terms the gold reported by Atjehnese to lie up some of die rivers. He could not, however, allow Brau and his colleagues to proceed into the interior over which he had no control. Af ter a month's travel on the coast, the two men turned their attention to Lohong, the northernmost river-state on the West Coast of Atjeh and óne of the most pro-Dutch. After examining the very limited goldworking carried on there by a dozen Chinese Brau decided to attempt to make an establishment, if necessary on an agricultural base, in order to be on hand when the great gold rush he still expected became possible. 121 While awaiting government approval for more extensive operations in Lohong, Brau and Errington de la Croix accepted in August 1880 an invitation from Hugh Low to visit Perak. De la Croix remained for seven months investigating Chinese and Malay tin-mining methods there. He obtained two tin concessions which became the basis of the Société des Étains de Pérak, formed in Paris for the purpose.
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Brau de St-Pol Lias, however, remained obsessed with the elusive promise of Sumatra. He left Perak after a few weeks to tour the Deli area orice more, until permission arrived to explore Lohong without Dutch escorts. Then he rushed back to stay with 'mon ami Ie kèdjou-rouan' at Lohong, and to stake out a concession intended to become his Atjeh base. Seldom can such enthusiasm have been lavished on less promising prospects. Fortunately for Brau de St-Pol Lias the Governor-. General refused to ratify his concessions despite three months of urgent lobbying in Batavia at the beginning of 1881. The Frenchman appears finally to have abandoned the project in favour of the müch more realistic Perak venture, and was thus spared the certainty of disaster as Dutch authority was gradually eroded in Atjeh. 123 Brau's later interests shïfted to Mainland Southeast Asia, with a mission to Burma and Indo-China in 1884. His continuing fascination with Atjeh gold, however, is evident from the fact that in the plethora of writing with which he publicised his 1880-1 expedition after his return to Paris there is scarcely a mention of the gold which was the principal object of his quest. Only in 1891 had his own hope of returning dropped to the point that he published details about the gold in his last book, La Cote du Poivre, for the benefit of 'those who will come after us'. The fascination aroused in Paris by Wallon and Brau de St-Pol Lias was a long time dying. Only nine months after Wallon's death his two brothers-in-law vvere in Singapore hoping to continue the gold-hunt under the pretext of searching for his body. The French Consul in Batavia, still suffering from the trauma of concealing the small armoury in Wallon's luggage from Dutch eyes, ensured that they did not reach Sumatra.
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By the end of 1882 another Compagnie Malaisienne was formed in Paris, and sent three men out to continue the gold hunt. The same formula of elaborate subterfuge was adopted. The leader, Paul Fauque, obtained a mission gratuite from the Minister of Public Instruction to continue the 'scientific' work of Wallon and Guilhaume and investigate their death. However 'certains affaires délicates' upset the financing of the project after arrival in Singapore. Fauque's two companions returned directly to Paris, and Fauque followed them after filling in two months exploring the commercial potential of Siak in East Sumatra. 120 The following May (1884) he returned to Sumatra, however, with Burlaud, who had already worked on a Deli plantation for two years. Fauque spent about two months in West Atjeh, at a time when the Dutch were hopelessly at odds with Teuku Imam Muda of Teunom, who was holding captive the British crew of the wrccked steamer Nisero. Fauque could not reach the Wojla area which was his principal aim, but he did explore Meulaboh, reporting optimistically about its coal and copper, though carefully avoiding any mention of gold.
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Not to be left out, Édouard Roura, quite probably the originator of this enduring French dream, managed to organise his own mission in France, where he had lived since 1878. Carrying the usual official commission, this time a hydrographic one from the French Naval Ministry, Roura reached West Atjeh in October 1883 with a French companion, Denis Richards. Once again, however, the French Consul was convinced that the scientific mission of M. Roura was a mask, and that he was charged by some French capitalists to study the mineral and other resources in the interior of Sumatra; perhaps even to obtain from the indigenous princes some concessions. Fauque, Rapport, pp. 14-24. Roura's friendship with the radjas óf Teunom and Wojla put him in a better position than his predecessors to negotiate concessions, but not to earn the approval of the Dutch.
By a curious chance, Roura and Richards were negotiating with the Radja of Wojla on the very day the Nisero was shipwrecked nearby. Roufa accepted a Dutch request to use his influence with Teuku Imam Muda of Teunom to negotiate the release of the twenty-nine crew members. However during the three days Roura was at Teunom, 29-31 November, the Radja evolved terms which included a British guarantee for the freedom of his trade, a brilliant stroke which immediately internationalised the issue and brought a powerfül Penang mercantile lobby on to his side. In a fury at this escalation of the issue Dutch officials immediately suspccted Roura, not without reason, of having assisted Teuku Imam to evolve these terms. He was immediately banned from the coast by the Dutch. 129 More bitter than ever, Roura went to Singapore to offer his services to the British in trying to free the crew. In face of Dutch hostility, however, Sir Frederick Weid reluctantly declined to use him. 130 Roura returned to Europe in 1884, but when the West Coast ports were re-opened a year later he hastened back to his search. By an intriguing coincidence he was also involved. in the second great affair of captured European mariners in Atjeh. On 14 June 1886 he dis-,embarked at Rigas as the sole passenger on the S.S. Hok Canton, to conclude a pepper-deal with Teuku Uma, the famous Atjehnese warleader who at that time was effective war-lord of the West Coast north of Teunom. A few hours later Teuku Uma's men attacked the five Europeans remaining on the ship, evidently with a view to capturing them and re-creating a Nisero situation. Roura re-appeared in time to conduct the Hok Canton back to Ulèëlheue after two of its officers had been killed and the other two captured, together with the captain's wife. The probability seems great that Uma's action was connected with remarks made by Roura, but no evidence has appeared to suggest any motive Roura can have had for involvement. of the century the Dutch mining engineer Jansen did investigate the best known areas of the Kawaj XII and Lohong, and came to largely negative conclusions about commercial possibilities. 132 Not until 1939 was a serious attempt made to work the gold of Kawaj XII on an economie scale. Brau de Saint-Pol Lias' patriotic wish was eventually fulfilled. It was the French enterprise, the 'Marsman Concern' which began commercial mining of Atjeh's gold. 133 
The King of the Sedangs
It is, perhaps, a little unfair to end this chronicle of false starts on a note of pathetic absurdity, particularly as Charles David de Mayréna 134 appears never to have set foot in Sumatra. Yet in the magnificence of his style, the quixotic heroism of his preoccupations, and the unreality of his finaricial basis, there is something characteristic of nineteenth century French ventures in that island. 'Good-looking, a crack shot... intelligent and energetic', 135 Mayréna was a French caricature of James Brooke, with all of the style but little of the substance. He had a dashing military career until wounded in the Franco-Prussian war. Later, in 1883, he had to leave France suddenly when he was accused of embezzlement, and from that point sank ever deeper into a fantastic world of his own devising. He made his way to Java, where he lived on credit for almost a year bef ore being deported in August 1884 on another charge of embezzlement. From that point he styled himself Ie Baron David de Mayréna, this last • name being one his father, a naval officer, had adopted to distinguish himself from other members of the family. In 1890 he adopted another title, Nevertheless his experience gave him good value on. his return to Paris, where he let it be known that he had deserted from the Putch army in Atjeh (as dozens of European soldiers of fprtune had done) and obtained the complete confidence of the Sultan of Atjeh. The exaggerated optimism about Atjeh raised in Paris financial circles by Brau de St-Pol Lias and Wallon played into his hands. The Atjehnese, moreover, were just celebrating the great triumph of a Dutch retreat to a 'concentrated line' occupying only a few square miles of Atjéh territory. Mayréna was able to persuade a Paris broker, baron Sellière, to advance him 30,000 francs to return to Atjeh and take over the lucrative sections of the Sultanate's economy, including mining, arms manufacture, and the minting of money. Despite his dubious past, he also received a commission from the Ministre de 1'Instructión Publique for scientific exploration in Atjeh. 137 On arrival in Saigon in May 1885, however, Mayréna and his brother Henri made no serious attempt tó reach Sumatra, but used Sellière's money profitlessly in Saigon. Sellière's backing and the Government commission were : both withdrawn in 1886. 138 Nevertheless Mayréna had a phenomenal success in Indp-China. By January 1888 he had persuaded the colonial government to entrust him with a semi-ófficial political task among the these practices and prosecuted him for fraud, he threatened to sell his kingdom to the Germans. 139 In 1889 the King of the Sedangs returned to Paris in the hope of winning official recognation and money. He obtained neither, despite the regal style with which he graced society functions and issued highsounding titles. In July 1889 he moved to Belgium for greater security against law suits. There at last he found another credulous financier. The young Belgian industrialist Somsy paid all his debts and financed his return to his kingdom with five well-connected young Belgians, eleven cases of arms and ammunition, and plentiful supplies. 140 On arrival in Singapore, however, in February 1890, Mayréna's arms were seized by the police. France and Siam both made clear that he would not be allowed to reach his kingdom through their territories. Rapidly Mayréna's world began to collapse and his companions to desert him. He began to talk again of going to Sumatra to lead the Atjehnese armies against the Dutch. Even though he became a Muslim and took a Malay wife (his fourth), named Aisa, he had little success raising an army among the Muslims of Singapore. As his fantasy world began to appear ridiculous, he left Singapore in March to live out his dream in the isolation of Pulau Tioman, a tiny island off Rompin, in Pahang. He died under mysterious circumstances on 11 November 1890, leaving only the anjing peranchis (French dogs) of Pulau Tioman as a permanent mark of his sojourn in the Malay world. 141 Mayréna appears to have been the last French adventurer to consider intervening directly in Indonesian affairs at the periphery of the Dutch empire, in defiance of Dutch claims to authority. Subsequent French interest in the area, in the shape of planting and commercial concerns as well as a fine scholarly tradition, operated through the Dutch colonial framework. Indeed many French scholars and officials, like Angoulvant and Bousquet, were attracted to Dutch rather than British colonies in search of parallels with their own.
The chronicle of French activities in Sumatra remains a disjointed one, with no connecting thread beyond the persistence with which bold ventures wère left to languish or diverted into profitless paths. The name of France nevertheless remained formidable, if mysterious, to many of the coastal peoples, and played a role in their diplomatic calculations.
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